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ABSTRACT
Endowment payouts have become an increasingly important component of universities’ revenues in
recent decades. We test two leading theories of endowment payouts: (1) universities smooth endowment
payouts, or (2) universities use endowments as self-insurance against financial shocks.  In contrast
to both theories, endowments actively reduce payouts relative to their stated payout policies following
negative, but not positive, shocks.  This asymmetric behavior is consistent with “endowment hoarding,”
especially among endowments with values close to the benchmark value at the start of the university
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  Endowments have become an increasingly important source of financing for universities 
over the past two decades, as the growth rate of the average endowment has far outpaced the 
growth rate of university expenditures.  Much of this endowment growth is attributable to the 
positive investment returns that resulted from the gradual shift of endowment investments from 
fixed income to equities in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a shift towards alternative assets 
such as hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital in the 1990s and 2000s (Lerner, Schoar, 
and Wang 2008).  Although this shift provided endowments with impressive average returns, it 
also increased endowments’ exposure to financial market risk, including the large market 
downturns witnessed in 2001-2002 (the bursting of the technology bubble) and 2008-2009 (the 
global financial crisis).  This paper uses these financial market fluctuations to test alternative 
economic theories of endowment payout behavior.   
  Several of the leading minds of the economics profession have written normative models 
of university endowments that have implications for endowment payout policy.  Tobin (1974) 
presents a model in which endowments smooth the income provided to the universities they 
support.  Merton (1992) analyzes a portfolio choice model in which endowment payouts are one 
part of a university’s overall revenue stream, and argues that endowments should be used to 
hedge shocks to other revenue sources.  Black (1976) also emphasizes the idea of endowments as 
a form of self-insurance, noting that “it is important to see the endowment fund as just one of the 
university’s sources of income.”  Despite this theoretical attention, the empirical literature on 
endowment payouts is surprisingly thin.  We step into this void by analyzing the payout behavior 
of endowments, focusing specifically on how endowment payouts respond to both positive and 
negative financial shocks.  Our empirical results are inconsistent with both of these theories as 
positive descriptions of endowment behavior.              
To empirically document how endowments respond to shocks, we combine several 
sources of data into a panel that includes information on both endowments and their affiliated 
universities.  We measure endowment shocks both by endowment returns as well as the returns 
normalized by endowment size relative to university total costs.  To allow for asymmetric 
responses, we decompose endowment shocks into positive and negative shocks.  Although 
endowments experienced considerable growth over our 1987 – 2009 sample period, they also 
experienced two severe negative financial shocks – the collapse of the technology bubble and the 
global financial crisis.      2 
Our panel data allow us to control for a rich set of covariates, including university fixed 
effects and state-by-year-by-public/private fixed effects.  As such, we control directly for all 
time-invariant characteristics that might be unique to a given university (e.g., its location, 
history, prestige, etc.), as well as control for any factors that might differentially affect a given 
state, be specific to a given year, or even be specific to a given type of institution (public versus 
private) within a specific state within a specific year (e.g., economic and financial conditions or 
demand for certain types of universities that may vary both regionally and over time).  Our 
identification therefore comes from studying different responses by universities of the same type 
(i.e., public or private), in the same state, and in the same year, to differences in the size of both 
positive and negative endowment shocks, while controlling for time-invariant differences across 
universities. 
  Our primary finding is that university endowments exhibit an asymmetric response to 
contemporaneous positive and negative financial shocks.  Specifically, following positive shocks 
endowments tend to follow their own stated payout policies (e.g., pay out 5% of the past three-
year average of endowment values).  Whereas following contemporaneous negative shocks, 
many endowments actively deviate from their stated payout policies, actually reducing payout 
rates to a level below that implied by their standard smoothing rules.  We also fail to find 
consistent evidence that universities change endowment payouts to offset shocks to other sources 
of university revenues.  These findings, which we confirm through several robustness checks, 
suggest that endowments’ behavior is inconsistent with either the “smoothing” or the “self-
insurance” hypotheses.   
Given the rejection of these normative hypotheses, we turn to an alternative hypothesis, 
which we refer to as “endowment hoarding.”
1  This idea is captured succinctly by Hansmann 
(1990, p. 38) who argues that “maintenance of an endowment is often viewed as an objective in 
its own right, rather than as simply a means to an end.”  Similarly, Conti-Brown (2011, p. 704) 
speculates that university administrators limit payouts, even in bad economic times, because they 
value endowment size as a “symbol of status and prestige.”  Our core result regarding the 
asymmetry payout response to endowment shocks (i.e., reduced payouts following negative 
shocks, but no response to positive shocks) is, to our knowledge, the first careful empirical test 
                                                 
1 This terminology is motivated by Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), who has repeatedly accused university 
leaders of “hoarding assets”.  See http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/12/09/grassley-renews-focus-
endowments and http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=38191.   3 
of the “endowment hoarding” hypothesis, and the results are supportive of this view.  To further 
refine our test, we examine situations where the incentive to hoard assets would be particularly 
strong: we create a variable “president’s benchmark”, which is the ratio of the current 
endowment size to its size at the beginning of the president’s tenure, the idea being that 
university leadership may be particularly sensitive to growing the size of the endowment from 
what they inherited.  We find a sharp non-linearity in the response of payouts to endowment 
shocks: the asymmetric response to shocks is driven entirely by universities whose endowments 
are within 10% of the president’s benchmark.   
We then examine whether this payout behavior has real consequences for university 
operations.  Although the link between financing decisions and real activities of corporations has 
long been considered an important research question, dating back to the work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), ours is the first study to provide evidence on how financial shocks to endowments 
affect universities.  Given that universities do not fully smooth over negative shocks (and, 
indeed, do the opposite), we expect universities to adjust on some other margin.  Consistent with 
this view, we find that these shocks indeed impact universities’ real operations, namely, 
university employment.
2  Specifically, we find that, relative to universities with smaller shocks, 
universities with larger negative endowment shocks respond, on average, by reducing tenure-
system faculty: a negative endowment shock that is equivalent to 10% of a university’s budget 
leads to a 2.9% reduction in the number of tenure-system faculty during the year of the negative 
shock (either through less hiring, greater attrition, or more dismissals), with an additional 6.1% 
reduction in the following year.  In contrast, we do not observe any changes in the number of 
faculty following positive shocks.  In addition to reducing tenure-system faculty, universities 
react to negative shocks by cutting support employees (e.g., secretaries) and maintenance 
employees to a similar extent.  We find no effect, however, on the number of adjunct faculty or 
administrators.  Consistent with the results for payouts, the effects of negative endowment 
shocks on staffing are concentrated among universities whose endowments are close to the 
president’s benchmark value, as these are precisely the universities that experience the largest 
endowment payout reductions. 
                                                 
2 Focusing on university employment decisions has several advantages.  First, salaries and benefits to university 
employees are sizeable, representing roughly 60% of the typical doctoral university’s budget.  Second, the 
classifications and counts of university employees are measured consistently across universities and within a given 
university over time, enabling valid cross-sectional and time-series comparisons.   4 
  Understanding the real effects of endowment behavior is important for several reasons.  
At a broad level, universities serve as a major source of knowledge creation and dissemination 
and thus contribute to the global stock of human capital.  Our research contributes to the 
understanding of whether financial markets have an effect on these educational activities and 
thus provides evidence on a channel through which financial markets can influence the real 
economy in important and long-lasting ways.  At a more personal level, many of the readers of 
this paper will likely be scholars employed by U.S. doctoral institutions, and the effect of 
endowment shocks has the potential to influence our profession in a very direct way.  In addition 
to endowment shocks, our study may also provide insight into how universities respond to other 
types of financial shocks, such as shocks to public funding or changes in gifts, grants, and 
contracts.  The advantage of using endowments to identify a university’s response to resource 
shocks is that these shocks are largely exogenous, as the variation arises from historical 
differences in activities to build and invest an endowment combined with fluctuations in global 
financial markets.  In contrast, other types of variation in a university’s resource base might be 
endogenously determined.  Finally, our results have implications for the current policy debate 
about the proper role and payout policies of endowment funds. 
The paper proceeds as follow.  Section 1 provides an overview of university 
endowments, their payout policies, and their recent growth.  Section 2 reviews the economic 
theories of endowment payouts, highlights the empirical implications of these theories, and 
discusses testable hypotheses.  Section 3 discusses our research methodology.  Section 4 presents 
the core results, and the robustness tests that rule out alternative explanations such as legal 
constraints on spending.  Section 5 tests the endowment hoarding hypothesis, that payout 
decisions are influenced by a desire to grow the endowment, especially relative to the 
endowment’s value at the start of a university president’s tenure.  Section 6 provides evidence on 
how these payout responses affect universities’ real operations, specifically personnel decisions.  
Section 7 concludes.  
1. An Overview of University Endowments 
1.1. What is an Endowment? 
Endowments consist of both financial and real assets held to generate income for current 
and future operations of their affiliated universities (Ehrenberg 2009).  Typically, the size of the   5 
endowment reported by a university consists of both “true endowments” (assets specified by the 
donor to be held in perpetuity) as well as “quasi-endowments” (funds the university treats as an 
endowment but which could be spent should the university so choose).
3 
Although endowments are usually separate legal entities from the universities they serve, 
endowment boards are typically appointed by the university.  Indeed, most endowment board 
members are also university trustees.  Endowment boards typically delegate the selection of 
investment managers to the endowment board’s investment committee, but in the majority of 
cases the university retains direct control over spending rates.  Even when authority for spending 
is formally granted to the investment committee, as is the case for approximately 38% of 
endowments, anecdotal evidence suggests that university leadership has enormous influence over 
those decisions that directly influence resource allocation to the university.  Indeed, in more than 
two-thirds of endowments, the university president sits on the investment committee.  In more 
than three-quarters of endowments, the president, the CFO (who reports to the president), or both 
serve on the investment committee.  As such, it is generally believed that university presidents 
have substantial influence over payout decisions.
4           
1.2. Endowment Payout Policies and Payout Rates 
Unlike private foundations, which are required by law to make minimum payouts each 
year, university endowments are not subject to such restrictions.  Nonetheless, nearly all 
university endowments follow payout policies that distribute money to support the educational 
mission of their affiliated university.  The typical endowment spending policy specifies a payout 
rate that is applied to a multi-year moving average of endowment values.  For example, an 
endowment’s spending policy might specify that it spends 5% of a three-year moving average of 
its endowment balance.  This rule has the effect of partially smoothing payout levels as the 
endowment size changes over time.   
When discussing payout rates, it is useful to distinguish the rate specified in the 
endowment’s spending policy and applied to a moving average of prior years’ endowment 
values, from the payout rate defined as actual dollar payouts relative to the contemporaneous 
endowment value.  To help distinguish these two different concepts of payout rates, we use the 
                                                 
3 Hansmann (1990) and Dimmock (2012) use the term “quasi-endowment,” whereas Ehrenberg (2009) uses the term 
“funds functioning as endowments.”   
4 See Brown, Dimmock, Kang, Richardson, and Weisbenner (2011) for further details on endowment governance.   6 
terms “policy payout rate” and “payout rate.”  A simple example is useful for illustrating this 
distinction:  Suppose an endowment has a value of $70 million at the start of year t-2, 
experiences net growth of $10 million per year for the next three years (where net growth 
includes new donations and returns on existing balances, minus payouts to the university), 
followed by a substantial loss of $20 million during year t+1, and no net growth in year t+2.  The 
chart below illustrates how payout amounts would follow these endowment values assuming the 
endowment follows a policy of paying out 5% of a past 3-year moving average.  
 
  t-2  t-1  t  t+1  t+2  t+3 
Endowment Value  
(beginning of year)  $70  $80  $90  $100  $80  $80 
Net Growth in Endowment 
(during year)  $10  $10  $10  -$20  $0  - 
Payout Amount  
(during year)  -  -  $4.0  $4.5  $4.5  $4.3 
“Policy Payout Rate”  
(payout amount divided by past 3-
year average endowment value) 
-  -  5.0%  5.0%  5.0%  5.0% 
“Payout Rate” 
(payout amount divided by 
current year endowment value) 
-  -  4.4%  4.5%  5.6%  5.4% 
   
This example illustrates the inherent smoothing effect of multi-year averaging payout 
rules.  While the “policy payout rate” is constant at 5% as specified by the payout rule, the 
contemporaneous “payout rate” is below 5% in rising markets and above 5% in falling markets.  
Because the policy payout rate is defined based on historical endowment values, financial shocks 
during the year should not affect payout amounts during that year.  Rather, a shock this year will 
affect future payouts through the moving average formula.  Whether endowments adhere to their 
stated payout policies is an important focus of our empirical work, and we will return to these 
ideas in Section 2 below.     
1.3. Data on Endowments and Universities  
The best available source of data on university endowments is the series of annual 
surveys conducted on behalf of the National Association of College and University Business 
Officers (NACUBO).  These data have been used in several studies of endowment investment 
behavior, including Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008), Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu (2010), Barber   7 
and Wang (2011), and Dimmock (2012).  These data cover the period from 1986 through 2009
5 
(where 1986 and 2009 refer to the 1985-86 and 2008-09 academic years, respectively) and 
provide information on the market value of the endowment, investment performance, payout 
rates, as well as other information.
6  For a more detailed description of the NACUBO data, we 
refer the reader to Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu (2010). 
We are also interested in characteristics of the universities that the endowments support.  
Thus, we merge the NACUBO data with data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS), collected by the National Center for Educational Statistics (a division of the 
U.S. Department of Education).  These data include extremely rich information on nearly every 
aspect of universities, including numbers of employees by job category.
7 
For some of our analysis, we also use information from the Commonfund endowment 
surveys.  The Commonfund is a non-profit organization whose stated mission is to “enhance the 
financial resources of nonprofit institutions and to help them improve investment management 
practices.”
8  The Commonfund surveys provide more detailed information about the specific 
payout policies for a subset of the institutions in the NACUBO sample.   
To examine how endowments respond to shocks, we focus on universities with the 
Carnegie Classification of “doctoral” (i.e., universities that offer Ph.D. degrees)
9 for three 
reasons.  First, endowments tend to be relatively more important for these institutions than for 
other colleges and universities (the obvious exception being a small set of prestigious liberal arts 
colleges).  Second, doctoral institutions are a more homogeneous group than all colleges and 
universities, thus allowing us to more cleanly focus on the effect of endowment shocks.  Finally, 
more reliable and longer time-series data are available for doctoral institutions than for 
institutions with other Carnegie classifications.
10      
                                                 
5 In 2009, NACUBO merged its endowment survey with the Commonfund’s endowment survey.  The data for the 
2008-2009 academic year comes from the joint NACUBO-Commonfund Endowment Survey (NCES).  For 
expositional simplicity, we refer to this merged datasets as the NACUBO data set throughout the paper.  
6 Since our regression analysis controls for lagged values of the independent variables, 1988 is the first year used.  
7 Coverage in the dataset differs by variable.  The numbers of employees by job category are available throughout 
the sample except for the years 1988, 1990, and 2000.  Endowment payouts are available from 1993 onward.  
Endowment size, endowment returns, and total university costs are available over the full sample period.   
8 See http://www.commonfund.org/Commonfund/About+Us/commonfund_mission_2004.   
9 For more information on Carnegie Classifications, see http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/.   
10 Most doctoral universities participate in the NACUBO endowment survey for the entire period.  In contrast, non-
doctoral institutions generally entered the sample more recently.     8 
In 2008, there were just over 200 U.S. doctoral universities with endowment data 
available through the NACUBO surveys.  This sample accounts for 80% of all doctoral 
institutions, 94% of total spending, 90% of students, and 99.9% of federal research spending of 
the entire universe of U.S. doctoral institutions.  Throughout the paper, for expositional purposes, 
we use the term “universities” to refer to doctoral universities. 
 
1.4. The Size, Growth, and Volatility of University Endowments 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics for our sample of institutions from the 1985-86 
academic year through the 2008-09 academic year.  As shown in the first row of Table 1, 
endowment size varies tremendously, with the mean endowment size of nearly $740 million 
being significantly larger than the median of $193 million.  The largest endowment in the sample 
is Harvard University, with a June 2008 value of more than $43 billion.   
In the second row of Table 1, we report the distribution of the endowment-to-cost ratio 
(endowment market value normalized by annual university budget) for all doctoral institutions.  
This ratio measures the importance of the endowment to university operations, and we again see 
tremendous heterogeneity.  The mean ratio is approximately 1, suggesting that a 10% change in 
the size of the endowment is of comparable magnitude, on average, as a one-time, 10% shock to 
a university’s spending.   
As illustrated in Figure 1, the aggregate value of the endowments held by U.S. doctoral 
universities has increased tremendously over the past two decades, growing to $370 billion in 
2008 from $31 billion in 1986, before declining to $273 billion in 2009 as a result of the global 
financial crisis.  In Figure 2, we compare the growth in endowment values over our sample 
period with that of university budgets.  In the top chart, we simply plot the growth rates of the 
average endowment value and average annual university budget.  In the bottom chart, we plot the 
growth rates of the median values of these two variables.  The annual growth rate for the average 
(median) endowment is 8.7% (8.3%) over 1986-2009, outpacing the growth rate for the average 
(median) university budget of 6.4% (5.7%). 
Although our sample period was dominated by rising equity markets, it was not immune 
from negative shocks.  The recent drop in endowment values is quite substantial in both dollar 
amounts and percentage terms; however, it appears somewhat less drastic when placed in 
historical perspective.  For example, as a result of the recent market declines, endowments, on   9 
average, returned to their level of about three years earlier (i.e., 2006).  Thus, the extent to which 
universities felt the pain of the recent declines depends, in part, on how quickly they 
incorporated prior endowment gains into their payout decisions.   
  Turning to Table 1, we find that payout rates (the amount of money transferred from the 
endowment to the university in a given year normalized by the market value of the endowment at 
the start of the year) are generally between 4-5%.  For the full sample, endowment payouts cover 
about 5% of a university’s total costs, with endowments accounting for at least 12% of the 
annual budget at one-tenth of universities.  The average annual endowment return is 9.0% over 
the full sample period, with a two-year average cumulative return over the 2001 and 2002 
academic years of -9.2%, and an average return of -19.7% over the 2008-9 academic year.  
Figure 3 illustrates both the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the performance of 
endowments over the full sample period. 
  Table 1 also shows that, not surprisingly, the main component of university expenditures 
is payment to employees: salaries and benefits account for 58% of the average university budget 
for the full sample; with a tight distribution across universities (the 10
th percentile budget share is 
42% and the 90
th percentile budget share is 65%).  The average (median) number of full-time 
employees is 4,892 (3,897).  Tenure-system faculty account for just over one-quarter of the 
workforce of a typical university, with support employees (e.g., secretaries) accounting for just 
under half of all full-time employees.
11  
 
2. Theories of Endowments and Testable Hypotheses  
2.1. Theories of Endowments 
  As noted by Hansmann (1990), Winston (1999), and others, the theory of the non-profit 
sector in general, and higher education in particular, is not as well-developed as standard 
producer or consumer theory.  Indeed, there is no consensus view in the literature on how to 
define the objective functions of universities or the endowments that help to support them.
12  
                                                 
11 The number of employees is measured at the end of the academic year (e.g., the 2009 number of employees 
reflects the head count as of June 30, 2009).   
12 Winston (1999) summarizes a number of ideas relating to universities’ objective functions, including Clotfelter’s 
(1999) suggestion that universities are motivated by “the pursuit of excellence,” Bowen and Breneman’s (1993) 
notion that universities seek to improve the quality and equity of educational services, and James (1990) idea of 
“prestige maximization.”   10 
This lack of consensus is not due to a lack of attention, as several leading economists have 
proposed normative models of endowment behavior.            
The first theory of endowments comes from Tobin (1974) who argues that the trustees of 
an endowed institution should act as if the institution is immortal and seek to treat all generations 
equally.  Thus, his model suggests that the trustees should behave as if they have a zero 
subjective rate of time preference.  He further argues that current consumption should not benefit 
from the prospect of future gifts to the endowment, nor should changes in tuition, grants, or other 
revenue affect payouts.  The main implication of his model is that endowments should provide a 
smooth flow of real income to their affiliated universities.  In summarizing the early literature on 
endowment payouts,
13 Merton (1992) states that all of the early models take “as given that the 
objective for an endowment is to provide a perpetual level flow of expected real income.”    
Tobin’s (1974) “smoothing” model has two important empirical implications.  First, the 
short-term payout response to shocks should be small, because endowments should spread the 
gains and losses over time.  In the extreme, if a university’s endowment engages in complete 
smoothing over an infinite life, endowments should respond to permanent shocks by adjusting 
payout levels by the perpetuity value of the shock.  Second, endowments should respond 
symmetrically to positive and negative shocks; that is, their responses to positive and negative 
shocks should be of equal magnitude.   
The second theory of endowments is that they provide universities with the ability to self-
insure, such as allocating assets to hedge against revenue shocks or using the endowment as a 
form of precautionary savings that can be tapped when other revenues are unexpectedly low.  
Hansmann (1990) argues that one of the most compelling reasons to accumulate endowments is 
that “they serve as a financial buffer against periods of financial adversity.”
14  This idea is 
discussed in the context of asset allocation by Black (1976) and Merton (1992).  In the case of 
complete markets, Merton (1992) shows that asset allocation can allow endowments to perfectly 
hedge against shocks to other revenues.  In incomplete markets, however, Merton (1992) shows 
                                                 
13 Merton’s (1992) review includes papers by Eisner (1974), Litvack, Malkiel, and Quandt (1974), and Nichols 
(1974), among others.  For a more recent contribution to this literature, see Gilbert and Hrdlicka (2011). 
14 Hansmann (1990) also explains several other compelling reasons to hold endowments: “to insure the long-run 
survival of the institution’s reputational capital, they protect the institution’s intellectual freedom, and they assist in 
passing on values prized by the present generation.”  He goes on to question whether endowments are really 
managed in a manner that is consistent with these goals and suggests that “prevailing endowment spending rules 
seem inconsistent with most of these objectives” (p. 39).  However, he does not provide any rigorous empirical tests 
to support these arguments, and his conclusions have been criticized by Swensen (2000, p. 43-50), among others.   11 
that universities should adjust contemporaneous payout rates in response to both endowment 
shocks and other revenue shocks.    Thus a key role for endowment payouts may be to smooth 
out the effects of temporary shocks.  Alternatively, if rapid adjustments are costly, endowments 
may provide valuable liquidity in the face of permanent shocks, reducing the total adjustment 
costs for universities (e.g., by allowing a university to reduce tenured faculty through attrition 
rather than by eliminating an entire department).  To the extent that endowments serve as rainy 
day funds, either for endowment shocks or for other revenue shocks, we might expect 
endowment managers to be very conservative in their payouts during rising markets, thus 
engaging in precautionary saving, but then spend more aggressively during bad times.  This 
argument would imply an asymmetric response to shocks, with endowments slowly adjusting 
spending following positive shocks, but quickly increasing spending following negative shocks. 
 
2.2. Testable Hypotheses 
We test these theories of endowments by focusing on how endowments adjust payout 
amounts in response to contemporaneous and lagged shocks and whether the direction of any 
endowment payout response is symmetric with respect to positive and negative shocks.     
The vast majority of university endowments use a spending policy that calculates payout 
amounts as a fraction of an average of past endowment market values.  These policies can be 
viewed as an imperfect attempt to implement the Tobin (1974) smoothing model, as past shocks 
are gradually incorporated into payout decisions over several years.  Further, because these 
payout policies are based on past endowment values (Sedlacek and Jarvis 2010), they imply that 
there should be no relation between contemporaneous financial shocks and endowment payouts.  
Rather, payout rates should respond to endowment shocks with a lag.  As such, a finding that 
endowment shocks have little relation with contemporaneous payout rates, and that any relation 
is symmetric, would be consistent with the Tobin model.  The Tobin model further implies that 
there should be no relation between other revenue shocks and endowment payout rates.   
In contrast, the Black/Merton “self-insurance” model implies an asymmetric response to 
positive and negative shocks.  Following negative revenue shocks, endowments should increase 
contemporaneous payout rates.  Essentially, universities make insurance claims on their 
endowments in bad states of the world when additional payouts are more valuable.  Following 
positive revenue shocks, endowments should either decrease or maintain their payout rates.  The   12 
self-insurance model is less clear regarding the effect of endowment shocks.  In the formal model 
of Merton (1992), payout rates should respond symmetrically to positive and negative shocks.  In 
the next section, we will set forth our econometric specification, and restate these hypotheses in 
terms of the key coefficients in the model. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Defining Shocks 
To test these hypotheses, we examine how endowment payouts respond to endowment 
shocks.  We begin by simply regressing the natural log of payouts on endowment returns during 
the year (and a range of fixed effects).  We then examine how contemporaneous payout rates are 
affected by endowment shocks, which we measure by normalizing endowment returns by the 
endowment fund size relative to the university’s expenditures in year t-1.  
Specifically, we define endowment shocks as: 
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where subscript i denotes the university and subscript t denotes the academic year. 
Our measure of endowment shocks is meant to capture the intuitive notion that a 
university with a large endowment-to-cost ratio may be more responsive to endowment returns 
than a university with a small ratio.  For example, a university that relies on endowment income 
to cover the majority of its costs may respond to a given percentage return differently than a 
university whose endowment covers a trivial share of its costs.  In essence, our measure captures 
the variation in the “shock” that comes from both the endowment’s return and its size relative to 
university costs.  One can also think of the shock variable as the ratio of the change in the dollar 
value of the endowment to the dollar flow of university expenditures. 
Figure 4 illustrates both the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the shock variable 
from 1986 to 2009.  Over our sample period, as shown in Table 1, the average endowment shock 
to a university was a positive 0.09, suggesting that the average financial shock to the endowment 
represents 9% of the university’s total costs.  Most universities suffered through two years of 
negative endowment shocks over the period 2001-2002.  For example, in 2002, the average 
endowment shock was -0.054 (i.e., a shock equivalent to a 5.4% cut in the budget), with one-
quarter of universities having a shock worse than -0.076 and one-tenth having a shock worse   13 
than -0.127.  Of course, the 2008-09 shock corresponding to the global financial crisis was more 
pronounced, with even performers at the 90
th percentile experiencing a negative shock.   
As discussed in Section 2, the key to empirically testing the smoothing and self-insurance 
models is to separately examine how endowments respond to positive and negative shocks, and 
whether they respond contemporaneously or only with a lag (as expected from their smoothing 
rules).  In order to test for possible asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks, we 














, , Costs y   Universit Total
Size   Fund Endowment 
Return , 0 Max Shock
t i
t i














, , Costs y   Universit Total
Size   Fund Endowment 
Return , 0 Min Shock
t i
t i
t i t i   (3) 
Further, we include both contemporaneous and one-year-lagged values of these variables in our 
regressions.   
  Similarly, we create revenue shock variables to measure shocks to a university’s non-
endowment revenues.  The revenue shock variables are calculated using revenues from 
government appropriations (from federal, state, and local governments) and government gifts, 
grants and contracts (e.g., research funding through agencies such as NSF and NIH) received by 
the university.  In Table 1, we provide summary statistics for the fraction of university costs 
financed by different revenue sources.
15  We do not include some major sources of revenue, such 
as tuition or current-use donations, because universities have a relatively large degree of control 
over these revenue sources.  Note that if we include all revenue sources when constructing our 
revenue shock variables, the results are essentially unchanged.   
                                       
                        
                           
 
(4) 
Again, we decompose the revenue shock variable into positive and negative shocks, and include 
both contemporaneous and one-year-lagged values in all regressions. 
 
                                                 
15 The share of university costs financed by these three revenue sources plus endowment payouts is on average less 
than 1.0 because universities receive revenue from other sources such as hospitals.   14 
3.2. Estimation and Identification 
We use the endowment and revenue shock variables to test how endowments respond to 
these economic shocks.  Our baseline specification is: 
                                
                 
                    
                   
   
                  
                     
   
                    
                       
   
                                  
(5) 
The dependent variable in our main specification is the contemporaneous payout rate.  
We briefly explain the fixed effects strategy used in these regressions, and then turn to the 
independent variables of interest and recast the testable hypotheses from Section 2.2 in terms of 
these coefficients. 
The symbol  signifies the inclusion of a complete set of university fixed effects, and  
represents a complete set of state-by-year-by-private fixed effects (where “private” distinguishes 
private from public universities).  The inclusion of university fixed effects means that we 
compare differences in the dependent variable to differences in the shocks.  Thus, any differences 
in the dependent variable driven by time-invariant characteristic of a university (e.g., history, 
geography, composition of alumni base, etc.) are differenced out of the specification.  
Furthermore, these fixed effects control for differences between public and private universities 
such as in their sources of funding, administrative models, or political pressures; differences 
across states; differences over time,  and all interactions between these three factors (which 
control for, among many things, time-varying regional differences in economic conditions). 
  Given this rich set of controls, the primary source of variation that is used to identify the 
effect of shocks on payout rates and university employment arises from differences in two public 
(or two private) institutions within the same state in the same year.  For example, we are 
implicitly comparing how changes over time in the shocks faced by UCLA differ from shocks 
faced by UC-Berkeley, or how shocks faced by Northwestern University differ from shocks 
faced by the University of Chicago.   
Having explained the fixed effects used in the empirical tests, we discuss the predicted 
signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the shock variables implied by the theories outlined 
in the previous section.  If the Tobin (1974) model is taken literally, it predicts that all 
coefficients should equal zero, both for the endowment shocks and for the revenue shocks.  A   15 
less strict interpretation of the model might consider the effect of the smoothing rules used by 
endowments to set their payout rates.  In this case, it could be the case that β3 = β4 ≥ 0; all other 
coefficients would remain zero, even in this case. 
In contrast, the Black/Merton self-insurance model predicts that endowments will 
increase contemporaneous payout rates in response to negative shocks, and either maintain or 
reduce payouts following positive shocks.  This implies that β2 ≤ β1≤ 0 and β4 < β3≤ 0, and 
similarly for the revenue shocks γ2 ≤ γ1 ≤ 0 and γ4 < γ3 ≤ 0.   
We include revenue shock variables as a test of the self-insurance hypothesis.  Although 
we limit our revenue shock variables to include only revenue sources over which the university 
does not have direct control (e.g., from the government), we acknowledge that these other 
revenue shocks might be endogenously determined, such as if a state legislature changed funding 
in response to university spending.  Endogeneity, however, would bias our tests towards finding 
significant results for the revenue shock variables; we do not find significant results.  Another 
concern with the possible endogeneity of the revenue shock variables is that their inclusion could 
bias our results for endowment shocks.  Thus we include specifications both with and without the 
revenue shocks.  In all of our regressions, the inclusion of these other revenue shock variables 
does not significantly alter the coefficient estimates on the endowment shock variables.   
We also separately examine a subset of 69 university endowments covered in the 
Commonfund data over the period 2000-2009, for which we can precisely measure the exact 
trailing percentage rate applied to these lagged values.
16  For this subset of institutions, we 
analyze the extent to which the endowments deviate from their own payout policies and “actively 
manage” payouts to the universities. 
4. How Do Endowment Payouts Respond to Endowment Shocks? 
Before turning to the main specification outlined above, we begin by simply regressing 
the log of dollar payouts from endowments on endowment returns.  In column (1) of Table 2, we 
estimate a model that includes university and year fixed effects.  We find that, on average, if an 
endowment experiences a return of +10% (-10%), it responds by increasing (decreasing) payouts 
in the current year by 2.7%.  This coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level, rejecting the 
                                                 
16 We limit our sample to university endowments whose payout policies are based on a moving average of prior end-
of-year endowment asset values, as we can calculate the precise amount of expected payouts for these endowments.  
We do not consider universities that base payouts on a moving average of past quarterly endowment values, because 
NACUBO only reports end-of-year endowment values.    16 
null hypothesis that endowment payouts are insensitive to contemporaneous returns.  Thus these 
results are not consistent with what would be expected if endowments abided by their payout 
policies, which determine payouts as a function of a moving average of past endowment values. 
However, as shown in column (2), this average response masks a substantial and 
important asymmetry in payout responses.  We find that, as would be expected if endowments 
followed their own payout rules, the response to positive endowment returns is not significantly 
different from zero.  In sharp contrast, the response to negative endowment returns is 
economically large and statistically significant.  The coefficient estimate of 0.81 implies that a 
10% negative endowment return is associated with an 8.1% reduction in payouts, an effect that is 
significantly different from the effect of a 10% positive endowment return on payouts.  To put 
things in perspective, this result implies that given the average payout rate of 5.2% in our sample 
(Table 1), a contemporaneous negative return of 10% reduces payouts by approximately 0.42 
percentage points (= 0.1 * 0.8 * 5.2).
17    
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, we add state-by-year-by-private fixed effects in 
addition to university and year fixed effects.  This additional control allows us to measure the 
effect of endowment returns on payouts by comparing two public (or two private) institutions in 
the same state and in the same year.  It also allows us to control for a wide range of time varying 
factors that might otherwise spuriously drive the relation, such as state-specific economic trends 
or changes in state support for higher education.  We find a small increase in payouts following 
positive returns: a 10% positive return would increase payouts by 3%, or an increase in payout 
rates of 0.16 percentage points from an average 5.2% payout rate.  The effect of a negative return 
remains significantly larger, with a coefficient estimate of 1.08, suggesting that a 10% negative 
return leads endowments to actively reduce payout rates by 10.8%, or by approximately 0.56 
percentage points relative to the average payout rate.  Thus, this regression analysis highlights a 
striking asymmetry in endowment payout policy. 
                                                 
17 We stress that in our empirical analysis, a finding that universities “reduce” their payout rates in response to a 
negative return means that their payout amounts and payout rates are lower than what one would expect based their 
on payout policies.  Of course, this does not necessarily imply that the payout rates decline relative to the prior year.  
The payout rates could rise relative to prior years (as is typically the case when endowments fall in value), but if 
managers actively reduce their payout amounts below those implied by their rule, the payout rates will rise by less 
than one would expect from the application of the payout policies.  In the numerical example discussed in Section 
1.2, if an endowment’s payout rate was 5.2% in year t+2, instead of the 5.6% implied by their smoothing policy, this 
would still be an increase from the 4.5% payout rate of the prior year.  However, the 5.2% payout rate would 
represent a cut in the payout rate relative to that implied by the endowment’s payout policy.  In our discussion, we 
will refer to this deviation as a “reduction” in payouts.   17 
4.1. Endowment Shocks and Payout Rates       
As noted previously, the proportion of the total university budget funded from the 
endowment varies widely across universities.  Thus, in Table 3 we turn to an independent 
variable that weights endowment returns by the ratio of the endowment size to total university 
costs: the Shock variable defined in the previous section.   
In all columns of Table 3, we report the coefficient estimates from regressions of the 
endowment payout rate over the period 1993-2009 on our measures of contemporaneous positive 
and negative shocks.  The payout rate is defined as payouts made by the endowment to the 
university during the year divided by the endowment market value at the start of the year, and is 
expressed in percentage points.  All columns include university fixed effects as well as state-by-
year-by-private fixed effects.  In columns (2) and (3), we also include one-year lagged positive 
and negative shocks.  In column (3), we further control for contemporaneous and lagged shocks 
to other revenues.   
Across all three specifications, we find an asymmetric response to contemporaneous 
endowment shocks.  Specifically, when an endowment experiences a negative shock during the 
year equal to 10% of the university’s budget (i.e., 

t i, Shock = -0.10), the payout rate for the 
average endowment falls by a highly significant 17-19 basis points.  As we discussed earlier, 
these results do not necessarily imply that payout rates decline in absolute terms.  Rather, they 
indicate that after conditioning out the average level of changes in payout rates for comparable 
universities, universities with larger negative shocks have relatively lower payout rates.  Put 
differently, universities that experience larger negative shocks have lower payout rates than one 
would expect.  In contrast, when an endowment experiences a positive shock during the year 
equal to 10% of the university’s budget (i.e., 

t i, Shock  = -0.10), payouts from the average 
endowment are little changed.     
In column (3), we also test whether shocks to other revenue sources are related to 
endowment payouts.  The coefficients for the contemporaneous and lagged revenue shocks 
variables not jointly significant (p-value = 0.490), while the endowment shocks are jointly highly 
significant (p-value (0.005).  The negative coefficient on               
   is directionally 
consistent with the self-insurance hypothesis, although the effect is only weakly significant and 
neither the magnitude of the coefficient nor its significance are consistent across alternative   18 
specifications in our robustness tests.  Importantly, the inclusion of these variables does not 
affect our central result regarding the relation between endowment payout rates and endowment 
shocks; the effect of endowment shocks on endowment payouts is independent of the effect of 
other revenue shocks.  
It is also important to note that our rich set of institutional and state-by-year-by-private 
fixed effects controls for many changes in expectations.  Specifically, any change in expectations 
during any year for each group of universities from the same state and of the same type (i.e., 
public or private) will be accounted for by our fixed effects.  For example, changing expectations 
about government funding (whether it be state appropriations for public universities or federal 
funding for research grants) or changing expectations about asset returns are largely captured by 
state-by-year-by-private fixed effects.    
Indeed, for changing expectations to have any material effect on our results, they would 
have to be correlated with the size of endowment shocks.  In other words, it is not enough for a 
university to change its future expectations as a result of an endowment shock, but rather it must 
be the case that institutions that experience larger shocks make larger changes in their 
expectations (controlling for the change in expectations during the year common to all 
universities from the same state and of the same type).  To partially address this possibility, we 
test whether endowment payouts are related to the amount of life-income gifts held by the 
endowment.
18  In exchange for making a life-income gift, the beneficiary receives an annuity.  
The endowment “owns” and invests these gifts, but payouts to the university cannot be made 
from them until the beneficiary dies, and life-income gifts are not included in the reported 
endowment size.  Nonetheless, a university with a larger amount of life-income gifts can expect 
to have a larger endowment in the future.
19  Thus, we test whether the anticipation of the larger 
future endowment resulting from these life-income gifts affects the payout rate from the 
endowment today.  We find that this is not the case: interaction terms between the endowment 
shock variables and the ratio of life-income-gifts-to-endowment-size are not significant, and their 
inclusion in the regression leaves the coefficient estimate on the contemporaneous negative 
shock essentially unchanged. 
 
                                                 
18 These results are available upon request.   
19 Across all doctoral universities in 2008, the ratio of life-income gifts to endowment size averaged 0.10 (with this 
ratio exceeding 0.19 at one-tenth of universities).     19 
4.2. Endowment Shocks and Deviations from Payout Policies 
Although our fixed effects strategy should control for any unobserved differences in 
payout policies, we can further alleviate this concern by re-estimating the regressions in Table 3 
using the subset of university endowments for which we have sufficient information about their 
payout policies from the Commonfund data.  These analyses appear in columns (1) through (3) 
of Table 4.  As our dependent variable, we use the difference between actual payout rates and the 
hypothetical payout rates that would arise from a strict application of the endowment payout 
policies, expressed in percentage points.  We find an even stronger asymmetric response: a 10% 
negative shock reduces payouts by 47 to 57 basis points, whereas the coefficient for positive 
shocks remains small in magnitude and insignificantly different from zero.    
 
4.3. Robustness: Ruling out External Constraints on Payouts  
The interpretation of our findings depends critically on whether the cut in payouts is a 
choice, rather than the result of external constraints.  An important legal constraint on 
endowment payouts is the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), which 
historically placed restrictions on the payouts of endowments.
20  UMIFA’s restrictions on the 
payouts of endowments are well described in Gary (2004): “although variations exist, the general 
principles of UMIFA have been adopted almost universally … UMIFA created the concept of 
‘historic dollar value’ and then permitted the expenditure of appreciation in excess of historic 
dollar value if the institution determined that expenditure of the funds was prudent.  Historic 
dollar value was determined based on contributions to the endowment fund.  Income, 
appreciation and depreciation of assets did not affect historic dollar value.”  Given this restriction 
against spending the endowment below its historic dollar value, it is possible that universities 
found themselves constrained by UMIFA following negative endowment shocks.  For example, 
if a shock reduced the endowment value below the historical dollar value, then the university 
would be constrained to reduce expenditures in order to abide by the limits.  Such restrictions are 
typically applied on a gift-by-gift basis.  Indeed, even in the absence of UMIFA, donors 
themselves could impose constraints against spending the principal, either explicitly (e.g., in 
donor agreements) or implicitly (e.g., by placing pressure on endowment managers).     
                                                 
20 UMIFA was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1972.     20 
We perform additional specification tests, reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4, to 
ensure that such constraints cannot explain our results, even during the 2001-2002 negative 
endowment shocks when these constraints were more likely to bind.
21  To account for the 
possibility that in a particular year, a cohort of gifts may be underwater, and thus unavailable for 
payouts, we re-estimate the payout rate regressions presented in Table 3.  Using historical 
endowment data on annual donations and annual returns, we recreate the implied level of 
payouts that an endowment would make if it followed its payout policies and accounted for 
UMIFA restrictions under the following three assumptions: (1) the eligibility of each year’s gifts 
for inclusion in the imputed payouts is determined at the start of the academic year; (2) partial 
inclusion of a cohort of gifts is possible, i.e., if a given year’s gifts were valued at 103% of the 
original donation value, then up to 3% could be paid out from these gifts; (3) all donations given 
prior to 1998 were sufficiently above water that UMIFA was not binding (this assumption, which 
is made because of data limitations on historical donations, is unlikely to be problematic because 
returns prior to 1998 were sufficiently high that these gifts were unlikely to be underwater even 
after the technology bubble burst).  Accounting for these UMIFA restrictions on endowment 
payouts has virtually no effect on our key results.  Further casting doubt on the likelihood that 
our results are driven by external constraints is the fact that a large portion of endowments are 
quasi-endowments rather than true endowments.  As noted by Conti-Brown (2011), quasi-
endowment funds are not subject to the UMIFA restrictions, yet endowments typically do not 
increase the payout rate from quasi-endowment funds following negative shocks. 
 
4.4. Interpretation and Discussion 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are clearly inconsistent with the two normative models of 
endowment behavior discussed in Section 2.  We find that endowments respond asymmetrically 
                                                 
21 Most states relaxed the UMIFA rules over the 2006-2008 period.  “At its annual meeting in July 2006, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) and recommended it for enactment by the legislatures of the various states.  
UPMIFA is designed to replace the existing Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA)”.  See: 
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Prudent%20Management%20of%20Institutional%20Funds%20Act.  
Under UPMIFA, which has been adopted by 43 states to date, the historical-dollar-value method was replaced with a 
standard of prudence that applies to the decision-making process of the governing board (Gary 2004; Ehrenberg 
2009; and NACUBO-Commonfund 2009).  As such, the historical-value constraint would not apply during the later 
years of our sample and during the 2008-09 financial crisis, allowing endowment payouts even from gifts whose 
market value is below its historic value. 
   21 
to shocks and the contemporaneous response to negative shocks is quite substantial.  Thus, the 
Tobin (1974) model, while an elegant description of how some may think endowments ought to 
behave, does quite poorly in explaining actual endowment payout behavior.  The “endowments 
as self-insurance” hypothesis of Black (1976) and Merton (1992) fairs even worse.  Our evidence 
suggests that endowments’ behavior is exactly the opposite of that implied by this theory: rather 
than increasing payouts following a negative shock, endowments appear to actively reduce their 
payouts.  We further find that the estimated magnitude of this effect is virtually orthogonal to 
changes in other revenue sources.  Moreover, we do not find consistent results across 
specifications for the revenue shock variables.  Thus, we find little to suggest that endowments 
adjust payouts in response to the overall portfolio of university revenue sources.  Finally, while 
not the focus of this paper, the finding in previous studies that endowment portfolios are heavily 
concentrated in pro-cyclical asset classes (Lerner, Schoar, and Wang 2008; Gilbert and Hrdlicka 
2011) casts further doubt on the self-insurance hypothesis: if universities view endowments as 
self-insurance, their portfolios would not be so heavily invested in these asset classes. 
Our results also rule out two other alternative hypotheses that are not formally modeled in 
the literature (and thus were not explicitly discussed in Section 2).  The first hypothesis is that 
endowments behave myopically, and respond more quickly to endowment shocks than the 
smoothing models would imply.  This simple model based on myopic behavior would imply a 
contemporaneous response to both positive and negative shocks, whereas our results indicate that 
endowments only respond immediately to negative shocks.  The second hypothesis is that short-
horizon university officials wish to share endowment “gains” immediately with current faculty 
and students and postpone the “pain” for future administrators, and pressure endowments to 
spend accordingly.  Such a model would imply a large and immediate response in endowment 
payouts following positive shocks, and a lagged response to negative shocks.  Again, the 
prediction of this hypothesis is inconsistent with our evidence that endowments reduce payouts 
immediately in response to negative shocks. 
 
5.  The Endowment Hoarding Hypothesis  
  Given the lack of evidence to support the normative models of endowment payout rates, 
in this section we propose an alternative explanation that is consistent with our findings, namely 
the endowment hoarding hypothesis, which posits that university and endowment leadership care   22 
about endowment size above and beyond the endowment’s contribution to university operations.  
For example, if university leaders believe their future employment opportunities and/or prestige 
are functions of endowment size, they may have an incentive to maintain a large endowment.  
Moreover, the compensation of university leaders tends to rise with the growth of endowment 
size.  For example, Ehrenberg (2009) reports that university presidents are compensated at least 
in part based on endowment size.  These incentives could cause university presidents to respond 
slowly to positive shocks in order to grow the endowment, but quickly cut endowment payouts 
following negative shocks in order to maintain endowment size.  Our results are consistent with 
this prediction of the endowment hoarding hypothesis: following positive shocks, endowments 
are slow to increase payouts, thus allowing the endowment to grow.  In contrast, following 
negative shocks, endowments are quick to reduce payouts below the level implied by their own 
payout rules, thus limiting the “hit” to the size of the endowment.  
  To test this idea further, it is useful to look for evidence in situations where incentives for 
endowment hoarding are likely to be strongest.  To do this, we draw upon the corporate finance 
literature; Baker and Xuan (2009) find evidence that the stock price at the time the CEO joined 
the firm serves as a reference point when deciding whether to conduct a seasoned equity offering 
or to repurchase shares.  In a similar spirit, we hypothesize that university presidents might use 
the size of the endowment at the time they became president as an important benchmark when 
deciding upon endowment payouts.  Our hypothesis is that endowment payouts are more likely 
to be reduced following a negative shock if the current endowment value is close to the 
president’s benchmark (i.e., the value when he or she became president).   
  To test this hypothesis, we construct a variable, president’s benchmark ratio, defined as 
the ratio of the endowment’s value at the start of the current year to the endowment’s value when 
the university president took office.  We also construct an indicator variable for whether this 
ratio lies between 0.9 and 1.1 (12% of our observations).  We hypothesize that when endowment 
values are either just above or just below this personal benchmark, university presidents are 
especially sensitive to maintaining the size of the endowment.  In Table 5, we show how these 
variables are related to endowment payout rates.  In columns (1) and (2), respectively, we show 
that the log of the president’s benchmark ratio is positively correlated with payout rates, but that 
this effect disappears once we control for university fixed effects.  In columns (3), (4), and (5), 
we show that being close to the benchmark value is negatively correlated with payout rates, and   23 
that the magnitude of this effect is robust to controlling for the log ratio as well as for university 
fixed effects.  We find that payout rates are approximately 25 basis points lower for those 
endowments that are close to the president’s benchmark.
22 
  In Table 6, we repeat the three regressions from Table 3, but also include an interaction 
between the shock variables and an indicator variable for endowment-year observations that are 
within 10% of the president’s benchmark.  Recall that our key finding from Table 3 was that 
universities respond to negative endowment shocks by reducing payouts.  Here, we find that this 
result is driven entirely by those universities whose current endowment value is close (within 
10%) to the value of the endowment when the president started.  Thus, for universities that are 
close to the current president’s benchmark, a negative endowment shock equal to 10% of the 
university’s budget leads to a 46 basis point reduction in the endowment’s payout rate 
(0.10*(0.82+3.73) = 0.46) – see column (3) of Table 6.  For universities whose endowment value 
is farther away from the president’s benchmark, there is no significant relation between financial 
shocks and endowment payout rates.   
In Table 7, we continue to focus on the effect of endowment shocks on payout rates for 
universities whose endowment size is near to the president’s benchmark.  The coefficient 
estimates reported in Table 7 are the sum of each shock variable and its interaction with “Near 
Benchmark” (i.e., indicator variable that takes the value of one if the value of the university 
endowment at the start of the year is 90-110% of the value of the endowment when the current 
university president took office and zero otherwise) – this sum represents the effect of an 
endowment shock on payout rates for an endowment near the benchmark.   
The first three columns of Table 7 replicate the results in Table 6.  Columns (4)-(6) report 
results when the shock variables are also interacted with the log of the president’s benchmark 
ratio.  Columns (7)-(9) report results when the shock variables are also interacted with the tenure 
(in years) of the current university president.  In all regressions, we find that the importance of 
“Near Benchmark” in explaining the asymmetry in payout behavior remains unchanged.  We 
also find that the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms in columns (4)-(9) are 
insignificant.  The results in columns (4)-(6) show that the results in Table 6 are not driven by a 
                                                 
22 We have fewer observations in these payout regressions for several reasons.  First, we do not use observations 
from the president’s first year on the job.  Second, data on university presidents first became available in IPEDS in 
1990.  Thus we are unable to calculate the president’s benchmark for presidents who began their tenure before 1990, 
and these observations are excluded.   24 
general linear relation between endowment shocks and the president’s benchmark, but rather the 
results are specific to endowments whose current size is in a narrow band around their historic 
size when the president took office.  The results in columns (7)-(9) make clear that our results 
concerning payout policy when the value of the university endowment is “near a benchmark” do 
not simply pick up a spurious correlation between a president’s tenure and payout decisions.
23   
   
6. Do Shocks Matter? The Effect of Endowment Shocks on University Personnel 
Our empirical results thus far indicate that universities with larger negative endowment 
shocks respond by reducing their payout rates relative to universities with smaller shocks.  As a 
result, universities experiencing a negative endowment shock, one important component of their 
revenue streams, must respond along some other margin.  We show in our regressions above that 
this adjustment does not occur via other revenue sources.  Thus, to further understand how 
universities that experience large negative endowment shocks behave, we investigate how these 
shocks affect the most important university expenditure – personnel.  
  In Table 8, we show the effect of endowment shocks on university employment 
decisions.  The dependent variable in the regressions is the logarithm of the number of 
employees in a specific job category (i.e., tenure-system faculty, adjuncts/lecturers, support staff, 
maintenance, and administrators).  As with the payout regressions, we report the coefficient 
estimates on the contemporaneous and lagged measures of the positive and negative endowment 
shock.  For each job category, we report regression results without and with the additional 
revenue shock variables (in the odd and even numbered columns, respectively).   
  The results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that universities respond to a negative shock 
by reducing the number of tenure-system faculty (especially with a one-year lag).  As in the 
payout regressions, by “reduce” we mean a reduction relative to otherwise similar universities, 
which could imply either a reduction in absolute terms or a smaller increase.  In column (2), for 
an endowment shock equal to losing 10% of a university’s budget, we observe a 
contemporaneous 2.9% reduction in tenure-system faculty, with an additional 6.1% reduction in 
the subsequent year.  This reduction in tenure-system faculty could be accomplished through a 
reduction in new hires, an increased attrition rate (i.e., failing to replace faculty who retire or 
                                                 
23 In unreported results, we re-estimate these regressions, but exclude all universities at which the president’s tenure 
is less than three years.  The results are similar.   25 
depart), or increased terminations (at least for non-tenured faculty).  Although the corresponding 
coefficient estimates for the negative shocks are of similar magnitude for adjuncts (reported in 
columns (3) and (4)), they are imprecisely measured and are thus not statistically significant.   
The next four columns (columns (5)-(8)) indicate that following a negative endowment 
shock, universities also make very significant and immediate cuts in the number of support 
employees (e.g., secretaries) and maintenance workers.  A negative endowment shock equivalent 
to a 10% reduction in a university’s budget results in a 6.5% decline in the number of support 
employees and a 4.3% reduction in maintenance employees in the year of the shock. In contrast, 
according to columns (9) and (10) in Table 8, university administrators
24 are unaffected – there is 
no significant response to contemporaneous or lagged shocks for this group.
25 
As discussed earlier, the relative curtailing of endowment payouts in response to negative 
shocks is largely concentrated among universities at which the current endowment size is near to 
the historical endowment size when the president joined.  One would expect the operational 
responses documented in Table 8, to also be more substantial at these universities.  This is 
exactly what we find in Table 9 where we interact the four endowment shock variables with an 
indicator variable equal to one if the endowment is “Near Benchmark”.  For tenure-system 
faculty, support staff, and maintenance employees, the university’s contemporaneous response to 
a negative shock to the endowment is at least twice as large if the endowment is near the 
president’s benchmark than if it is not.  In column (1), for every 10% of a university’s budget 
that is lost in an endowment shock, we observe a contemporaneous 7.6% reduction in tenure-
system faculty if the endowment is near the benchmark but only a 3.4% reduction if it is not.  
                                                 
24 For reporting purposes, IPEDS assigns personnel into a single job category (e.g., tenure-system faculty or 
administration) based on the role in which they spend more than half of their time.  Although we recognize that the 
classification of personnel into faculty versus administrators may vary across universities, the inclusion of university 
fixed effects will control for these differences provided the classifications are reasonably consistent within 
universities over time.  There is no reason to believe that our finding is driven by a labeling issue, unless universities 
are more likely to re-classify faculty as administrators following negative shocks, and then revert back to labeling 
them as faculty in years without negative shocks.   
25 Summing the coefficient estimates on the contemporaneous and lagged negative shock variables results in the 
cumulative two-year university response.  For tenure-system faculty, the sum of coefficient estimates is 0.90, which 
is significant at the 1% level.  This point estimate suggests that tenure-system faculty face a relative reduction in 
numbers on the order of 9% during the two years following a negative endowment shock that represents a 10% loss 
to the university budget (relative to a university with no endowment shock).  The sum of the coefficient estimates 
for administrators is -0.44, suggesting that their ranks actually increase by 5% following the negative shock (though 
this estimate is not statistically different from zero).  However, the two-year cumulative effect on hiring following a 
negative endowment shock for administrators is significantly different from that for tenure-system faculty at the 5% 
level.  Thus, the number of administrators employed is significantly less likely to decrease (or more likely to 
increase) in the event of a negative endowment shock, when compared with tenure-system faculty.   26 
Such a shock also results in a contemporaneous 7.0% decline in the number of secretaries if the 
endowment is near the president’s benchmark (the cutbacks are about half this size if the 
endowment is not near the benchmark).   
   
7. Conclusions 
Over the past few decades, the growth rate of university endowments has far outpaced 
that of university expenditures, and endowment payouts have become an increasingly important 
component of most universities’ revenues.  We use financial shocks to endowments, particularly 
the responses to the technology-bubble collapse in 2001-2002 and the financial crisis in 2008-
2009, to study both the payout decisions of endowment funds and the resultant effects on 
universities’ operational decisions.   
We find that the payout policies of university endowments are generally inconsistent with 
the endowment models of Tobin (1974), Black (1976), and Merton (1992), in which endowment 
funds seek to smooth payouts or self-insure against shocks to aggregate university revenues.  
Instead, we find that although most universities have formal policies intended to smooth payouts 
over time, endowments significantly deviate from these policies following negative financial 
shocks by reducing payouts by more than their formal smoothing policies would suggest.   
Our results are consistent with a model in which university leaders care directly about the 
size of the endowment, perhaps due to the private benefits (e.g., prestige, future career 
opportunities, high compensation, etc.) they obtain from a larger endowment.  Consistent with 
this view, we find that our key results are driven primarily by endowments whose current value 
is close to the historical value when the current president’s tenure began.   
Next, we find that financial shocks to an endowment have real consequences for the 
operational decisions of the university.  As a result of negative endowment shocks, universities 
cut back on the hiring (or accelerate the firing) of employees across all job categories, with the 
exception of university administrators.  Consistent with our results on payout reductions, we find 
that these effects are driven primarily by endowments that are close to their benchmark value. 
Taken as a whole, our results provide strong evidence that endowment shocks have an 
important and significant effect on payout policies and the real operations of the universities that 
these endowments support.  Thus, our results provide new evidence on an unexplored channel 
through which financial markets affect real investments.     27 
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Source: NACUBO.  Year refers to academic year (e.g., 2009 is the 2008-09 academic year).  Endowment values are measured at the 
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Figure 2: Growth Rate of Endowment Size (Market Value) and University Costs  
at Doctoral Universities, 1986-2009 
 
 
Source:  NACUBO for endowment market values and IPEDS for total university costs.  Year 
refers to academic year (e.g., 2009 is the 2008-09 academic year).  Endowment values are 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Endowment Returns at Doctoral Universities, 1986-2009 
 
Source: NACUBO.  Year refers to academic year (e.g., 2009 is the 2008-09 academic year). 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Endowment Shocks at Doctoral Universities, 1986-2009 
 
Source:  NACUBO for endowment returns and market value and IPEDS for university costs.  Year refers 
to academic year (e.g., 2009 is the 2008-09 academic year).  The endowment shock for a university for a 
given year is defined as the endowment return during the year multiplied by the endowment market value 
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Table 1: Distributions of Various Characteristics of Endowments and Operations of Doctoral Universities, 1986-2009 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  10th  25th  Median  75th  90th 
Endowment Size, Payouts, and Performance               
Assets (market value, $M)  738.9  2,091.7  30.8  66.7  193.4  575.8  1,537.3 
Endowment-to-University-Cost Ratio  1.03  1.65  0.10  0.22  0.51  1.13  2.29 
Dollar Payout ($M)  40.5  105.4  2.0  4.4  11.1  34.0  90.6 
Contemporaneous Payout Rate (in percent)  5.2  1.3  3.8  4.5  5.2  5.9  6.7 
Payout-to-University-Cost Ratio  0.052  0.080  0.006  0.012  0.025  0.056  0.123 
Return (in percent)  9.0  11.4  -5.9  2.0  11.0  16.8  20.9 
Endowment Shock  0.09  0.26  -0.03  0.00  0.03  0.10  0.26 
Non-Endowment Revenue Sources               
Government Appropriations (share of all revenue)  0.21  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.22  0.38  0.47 
Net Tuition Revenue (share of all revenue)  0.31  0.20  0.11  0.16  0.25  0.40  0.64 
Government Gifts, Grants, and Contracts (share of all revenue)  0.19  0.18  0.06  0.10  0.14  0.21  0.31 
Revenue Shock (from government revenue sources)  0.01  0.09  -0.02  0.001  0.02  0.04  0.06 
Budget, Employment, and Salary Data               
Total University Costs ($M)  620  660  113  201  386  773  1,450 
Total Salary and Benefits for All Employees ($M)  361  434  65  118  221  419  825 
Budget Share of Salary and Benefits for All Employees  0.58  0.21  0.42  0.51  0.57  0.61  0.65 
Total Number of Employees  4,892  3,671  1,294  2,102  3,897  6,841  10,064 
Employee Share of Total University Employment               
Share of Tenure-System Faculty  0.26  0.11  0.14  0.18  0.23  0.31  0.41 
Share of Adjuncts  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.14 
Share of Support Employees  0.48  0.11  0.33  0.41  0.48  0.55  0.61 
Share of Maintenance Employees  0.12  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.12  0.15  0.18 
Share of Administrators  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.10  0.14 
Source: IPEDS.  Year represents academic year (e.g., 2009 represents the 2008-09 academic year).   33 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations among observations of a given university over time as 










Table 2: Relation between Payouts from Endowments and Endowment Returns 
  Ln(Endowment Payouts in $), 1993-2009 
  (1) 
  (2)    (3)    (4) 
 
           0.27 
**   
  0.48 
***   
 
  (0.12) 
   
  (0.16) 
   
 
         
   = Max(         , 0)   
  0.14 
   
  0.32 
* 
   
  (0.14) 
   
  (0.19) 
 
         
   = Min(         , 0)   
  0.81 
***   
  1.08 
*** 
   
  (0.31) 
   
  (0.38) 
 
p-value of test  
         
   =          
    N/A 
  0.062 
*  N/A 
  0.086 
* 
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Subsumed 
  Subsumed 
 
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  No 
  No 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
R-squared (within a university)  0.72 
  0.72 
  0.85 
  0.85 
 
Number of Observations  3,000 
  3,000 
  3,000 
  3,000 
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Table 3: Payout Rates of University Endowments (in percentage points) 
 
  Payout Rate, 1993-2009 
  (1) 
  (2)    (3)   
        
   =Max(        , 0)  -0.02 
  0.09 
  0.11    
  (0.17) 
  (0.18) 
  (0.19)    
        
   = Min(        , 0)  1.83 
**  1.68 
**  1.93 
** 
  (0.78) 
  (0.80) 
  (0.83) 
  
          
     
  -0.50 
***  -0.48 
** 
   
  (0.18) 
  (0.19) 
  
          
     
  -0.24 
  -0.31 
  
   
  (0.99) 
  (1.00) 
  
            
     
   
  0.51 
  
   
   
  (0.80) 
  
            
     
   
  -0.71 
  
   
   
  (1.05) 
  
              
     
   
  0.14 
  
   
   
  (0.71) 
  
              
     
   
  -1.93 
* 
   
   
  (1.15)    
Joint p-value of Endowment Shocks  N/A 
  N/A 
  0.005 
*** 
p-value of test         
  =         
    0.028 
**  0.067 
*  0.043 
** 
p-value of test           
  =           
    N/A 
  0.803 
  0.872 
 
Joint p-value of Revenue Shocks  N/A 
  N/A 
  0.490 
 
p-value of             
   =             
    N/A 
  N/A 
  0.396 
 
p-value of               
   =               
    N/A 
  N/A 
  0.153 
 
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
R-squared (within a university)  0.54 
  0.55 
  0.54 
 
Number of Observations  2,958 
  2,893 
  2,869 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations among 
observations of a given university over time as well as cross-sectional correlations.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   35 
Table 4: Deviations from Endowment Payout Policy and UMIFA Constraints (in percentage points) 
  Deviation from Payout Policy, 2000-2009  Payout Rate with UMIFA constraint, 1998-2009 
  (1) 
  (2)    (3)    (4) 
  (5)    (6)   
        
   =Max(        , 0)   -0.51 
   -0.63 
 
-0.43 
   -0.07 




  (0.38) 
  (0.40) 
  (0.44) 
   (0.19) 
  (0.20) 
  (0.21) 
  
        
   = Min(        , 0)  4.66 
***  5.18 
***  5.68 
***  1.78 
**  1.74 
**  1.79 
** 
  (1.79) 
  (1.88) 
  (1.91) 
   (0.81) 
  (0.83) 
  (0.86) 
  
          
     
  -0.01 
  0.20 
    
  -0.47 
**  -0.43 
** 
   
  (0.47) 
  (0.48) 
    
  (0.20) 
  (0.21) 
  
          
     
  0.83 
  0.70 
    
  -0.02 
  -0.09 
  
   
  (2.02) 
  (1.98) 
    
  (1.03) 
  (1.04) 
  
            
     
   
  2.39 
    
   
  1.06 
  
   
   
  (1.65) 
    
   
  (0.88) 
  
            
     
   
  -1.71 
    
   
  -1.10 
  
   
   
  (2.07) 
    
   
  (1.14) 
  
              
     
   
  4.16 
***   
   
  0.75 
  
   
   
  (1.14) 
    
   
  (0.77) 
  
              
     
   
  -4.14 
    
   
  -1.61 
  
   
   
  (2.77) 
    
   
  (1.22) 
  
p-value of test         
  =         
    0.011 
**  0.007 
***  0.006 
***  0.037 
**  0.059 
*  0.068 
* 
p-value of test           
  =           
    N/A 
  0.718 
  0.827 
  N/A 
  0.681 
  0.754 
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
R-squared (within)  0.74 
  0.74 
  0.75 
  0.57 
  0.58 
  0.60 
 
Number of Observations  607 
  604 
  603 
  2,238 
  2,192 
  2,185 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations among observations of a given university over time as 
well as cross-sectional correlations.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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See the Appendix for variable definitions.  “Near Benchmark” is an indicator for whether the value of the university endowment at the start of the year is 90-110% 
of the value of the endowment when the current university president took office.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations among 




* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Table 5: Relation Between Endowment Payout Rates and the University President’s Benchmark 
  Payout Rate (in percent) 
  (1) 
  (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
 
Ln(Ratio of Endowment Value at Start of Year to Endowment Value when  0.19 
**  0.07 
   
      0.02 
 
Current University President Took Office)  (0.09) 
  (0.13) 
   
      (0.13) 
 
Near Benchmark   
   
  -0.26 
**  -0.24 
**  -0.24 
** 
   
   
  (0.13) 
  (0.11) 
  (0.11) 
 
   
   
   
       
 
University Fixed Effects  No 
  Yes 
  No 
  Yes    Yes 
 
Number of Observations  2,004 
  2,004 
  2,004 
  2,004    2,004 
   37 
Table 6: Interaction of Endowment Shocks with  
Endowment Size Being Near President’s Benchmark 
 
    Payout Rate (in percent) 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
        
    -0.43 
  -0.19 
  -0.11 
 
  (0.28) 
  (0.31) 
  (0.32) 
 
        
   * Near Benchmark     0.22 
    -0.38 
  -0.39 
 
  (0.43) 
  (0.63) 
  (0.63) 
 
        
    0.86 
  0.72 
  0.82 
 
  (1.13) 
  (1.17) 
  (1.23) 
 
        
   * Near Benchmark     2.73 
**    3.54 
**  3.73 
** 
  (1.35) 
  (1.58) 
  (1.60) 
 
          
     
   -0.44 
  -0.42 
 
   
  (0.31) 
  (0.32) 
 
          
   * Near Benchmark    
  0.47 
  0.51 
 
   
  (0.55) 
  (0.55) 
 
          
     
  -1.00 
  -1.23 
 
   
  (1.54) 
  (1.56) 
 
          
   * Near Benchmark     
  -1.77 
  -1.83 
 
   
  (2.71) 
  (2.72) 
 
Revenue Shock Controls  No 
  No 
  Yes 
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
R-squared (within)  0.57 
  0.58 
  0.57 
 
Number of Observations  2,004 
  2,004 
  1,991 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  Each shock variables is interacted with an indicator for whether the value 
of the university endowment at the start of the year is 90-110% of the value of the endowment when the current 
university president took office (“Near Benchmark”).  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations 




significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Effect of Endowment Shocks on Payout Rates for  
Universities with Endowment Size Near President’s Benchmark 
 
    Payout Rate (in percent) 
  (1)    (2)    (3)      (4)    (5)    (6)      (7)    (8)    (9) 
 
(        
  ) + (        
   * Near Benchmark)  -0.21 
  -0.56 
  -0.50 
   
-0.33 
  -0.66 
  -0.59 
   
-0.27 
  -0.47 
  -0.369 
 
(total effect for endowment near benchmark)  (0.49) 
  (0.61) 
  (0.62) 
    (0.50) 
  (0.62) 
  (0.62) 
    (0.51) 
  (0.63) 
  (0.64) 
 
(        
  ) + (        
   * Near Benchmark)    3.60 
**    4.26 
**  4.55 
**      3.71 
**    4.33 
**  4.68 
**      3.59 
**    3.94 
**  4.16 
** 
(total effect for endowment near benchmark)  (1.67) 
  (1.78) 
  (1.88) 
    (1.69) 
  (1.81) 
  (1.90) 
    (1.78) 
  (1.91) 
  (1.96) 
 
(          
  ) + (          
   * Near Benchmark)   
  0.03 
  0.09 
     
  -0.03 
  0.02 
     
  -0.09 
  -0.04 
 
(total effect for endowment near benchmark)   
  (0.54) 
  (0.54) 
     
  (0.54) 
  (0.54) 
     
  (0.55) 
  (0.55) 
 
(          
  ) + (          
   * Near Benchmark)   
    -2.77 
  -3.06 
     
    -2.55 
  -2.87 
     
    -1.27 
  -1.50 
 
(total effect for endowment near benchmark)   
  (2.48) 
  (2.50) 
     
  (2.48) 
  (1.15) 
     
  (2.71) 
  (2.72) 
 
Shock variables interacted with Ratio of 
    Endowment Value to Value when President took office   No 
  No 















p-value of Shock-Ratio interactions  N/A 
  N/A 
  N/A 
    0.182 
  0.424 
  0.424 
    N/A 
  N/A 
  N/A 
 
 
Shock variables interacted with Tenure of 
    University President  No 
  No 















p-value of Shock-Tenure interactions  N/A 
  N/A 
  N/A 
    N/A 
  N/A 
  N/A 
    0.841 
  0.705 
  0.602 
 
   
   
   
     
   
   
     
   
   
 
Revenue Shock Controls  No 
  No 
  Yes 
    No 
  No 
  Yes 
    No 
  No 
  Yes 
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
    Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
    Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
    Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
    Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
R-squared (within)  0.57 
  0.58 
  0.57 
    0.57 
  0.58 
  0.58 
    0.57 
  0.58 
  0.57 
 
Number of Observations  2,004 
  2,004 
  1,991 
    2,004 
  2,004 
  1,991 
    2,004 
  2,004 
  1,991 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  “Near Benchmark” indicates that the value of the university endowment at the start of the year is 90-110% of the 
value of the endowment when the current university president took office.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations among observations of a 
given university over time as well as cross-sectional correlations.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Relation between University Employment (Logarithm of Number of Employees) and Endowment Shocks  
  Tenure System  Adjuncts  Support  Maintenance  Administration 
  (1)
    (2)
    (3)
    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)
    (9)
    (10)   
        
   =Max(        , 0)  0.01 
  -0.02 
   0.01 
  -0.06 
   -0.09 
  -0.07 
   0.00 
  -0.002 
   0.01 
  0.004   
  (0.03) 
  (0.03) 
   (0.16) 
  (0.16) 
   (0.06) 
  (0.06) 
   (0.05) 
  (0.056) 
   (0.08) 
  (0.08)   
        
   = Min(        , 0)       0.20 
  0.29 
**  0.23 
  0.47 
   0.69 
***  0.65 
***    0.46 
**  0.43 
**  -0.21    -0.15   
  (0.13) 
  (0.13) 
   (0.61) 
  (0.64) 
   (0.21) 
  (0.22) 
   (0.20) 
  (0.20) 
   (0.28) 
  (0.29)   
          
    0.03 
  0.05 
      -0.30 
**  -0.24 
   0.07 
  0.06 
   0.02 
  0.02 
   -0.05 
  -0.04   
  (0.03) 
  (0.03) 
   (0.15) 
  (0.15) 
   (0.05) 
  (0.05) 
   (0.05) 
  (0.05) 
   (0.07) 
  (0.07)   
          
        0.61 
***  0.61 
***  0.50 
  0.63 
   0.19 
  0.09 
   0.24 
  0.18 
   -0.32 
  -0.29   
  (0.19) 
  (0.19) 
   (0.90) 
  (0.90) 
   (0.31) 
  (0.32) 
   (0.29) 
  (0.29) 
   (0.41) 
  (0.41)   
            
     
  0.08 
    
  1.33 
**   
  -0.53 
**   
  -0.44 
**   
  0.37   
   
  (0.13) 
    
  (0.62) 
    
  (0.25) 
    
  (0.22) 
    
  (0.33)   
            
     
  0.51 
***   
  1.20 
    
  -0.24 
    
  0.14 
    
  0.03   
   
  (0.18) 
    
  (0.85) 
    
  (0.30) 
    
  (0.31) 
    
  (0.39)   
              
     
  0.24 
    
  1.35 
*   
  -0.19 
    
  0.09 
       0.15   
   
  (0.16) 
    
  (0.74) 
    
  (0.26) 
    
  (0.23) 
    
  (0.34)   
              
     
  -0.24 
    
  -0.94 
    
  0.03 
    
  0.19 
      -0.33   
   
  (0.18) 
    
  (0.85) 
    
  (0.32) 
    
  (0.28) 
    
  (0.42)   
p-value of test         
  =         
    0.158 
  0.033 
**  0.749 
  0.445 
  0.001 
***  0.004 
***  0.038 
**  0.056 
*  0.476 
  0.639   
p-value of test           
  =           
    0.001 
***  0.004 
***  0.369 
  0.357 
  0.026 
**  0.916 
  0.068 
*  0.592 
  0.342 
  0.570   
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes   
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes   
R-squared (within)  0.83 
  0.83 
  0.66 
  0.66 
  0.86 
  0.86 
  0.36 
  0.36 
  0.59 
  0.59   
Number of Observations  3,003 
  2,980 
  3,002 
  2,979 
  2,396 
  2,392 
  2,292 
  2,289 
  2,396 
  2,392   
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for correlations among observations of a given university over time as 
well as cross-sectional correlations.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    40 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  The “Total effect of         
   when endowment near benchmark” is the sum of the 
coefficient estimates on         
  and its interaction with Near Benchmark.  Other Shock variables are defined in a similar way.  
We omit the standard errors for the “Total effect of          
   when endowment near benchmark” effects and only indicate their 
statistical significance.  Near Benchmark indicates that the value of the university endowment at the start of the year is 90-110% 
of the value of the endowment when the current university president took office.  Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow 




significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 9: Relation between University Employment (Logarithm of Number of Employees) 
and the Interaction of Endowment Shocks with Endowment Size  
Being Near President’s Benchmark 
 
 
  Tenure System  Adjuncts  Support  Maintenance  Administration 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
        
   =Max(        , 0)  0.01 
  -0.04 
  -0.06 
  0.004 
  -0.05 
 
   (0.04) 
  (0.20) 
  (0.89) 
  (0.07) 
  (0.10) 
 
        
   * Near Benchmark   0.02 
  0.50 
  0.02 
  0.04 
  0.34 
* 
  (0.08) 
  (0.42) 
  (0.19) 
  (0.12) 
  (0.19) 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
          Total effect of          
     0.03 
  0.46 
  -0.04 
  0.05 
  0.29 
 
          when endowment near benchmark   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
        
   =Max(        , 0)  0.34 
**  0.64 
  0.34 
  0.27 
  -0.21 
 
   (0.15) 
  (0.76) 
  (1.48) 
  (0.22) 
  (0.34) 
 
        
   * Near Benchmark   0.43 
**  0.17 
  0.36 
  0.21 
  -0.18 
 
  (0.19) 
  (0.95) 
  (1.27) 
  (0.27) 
  (0.42) 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
          Total effect of          
     0.76 
***  0.81 
  0.70 
**  0.48 
  -0.39 
 
          when endowment near benchmark   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
          
     -0.01 
  -0.18 
  0.02 
  -0.02 
  0.05 
 
   (0.04) 
  (0.19) 
  (0.06) 
  (0.06) 
  (0.09) 
 
          
   * Near Benchmark   0.11 
*  -0.01 
  -0.001 
  0.02 
  -0.23 
 
  (0.07) 
  (0.35) 
  (0.10) 
  (0.11) 
  (0.15) 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
          Total effect of            
     0.11    -0.19 
  0.02 
  -0.002 
  -0.18 
 
          when endowment near benchmark   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
          
     0.41 
*  0.02 
  0.10 
  0.03 
  -0.82 
 
   (0.25) 
  (1.24) 
  (0.37) 
  (0.35) 
  (0.55) 
 
          
   * Near Benchmark   1.25 
***  3.38 
  -0.41 
  -0.32 
  1.68 
 
  (0.49) 
  (2.42) 
  (0.72) 
  (0.69) 
  (1.07) 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
          Total effect of            
     1.66 
***  3.40 
  -0.31 
  -0.29 
  0.87 
 
          when endowment near benchmark   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
Revenue Shock Controls  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
University Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
State-by-Year-by-Private Fixed Effects  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
 
R-squared (within)  0.87 
  0.69 
  0.88 
  0.42 
  0.64 
 
Number of Observations  2,224 
  2,230 
  1,765 
  1,690 





Appendix Table: Description of Variables 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 




Payouts made by the endowment to the university 
during the year. 
 
Payout Rate  Payouts made by the endowment to the university 
during the year divided by the endowment market 
value at the start of the year (expressed in 
percentage points). 
 
Deviation from Payout Policy  Payouts made by the endowment to the university 
during the year less the amount of payouts that 
would be implied by the endowment’s payout 
policy, divided by the endowment market value at 
the start of the year (expressed in percentage 
points). 
 
Tenure System  Logarithm of the number of tenure-system 
faculty. 
 
Adjuncts  Logarithm of the number of adjuncts/lecturers.   
 
Support  Logarithm of the number of support staff (e.g., 
secretaries). 
 
Maintenance  Logarithm of the number of maintenance 
employees.   
 
Administration  Logarithm of the number of administrators.   
 
 




Appendix Table: Description of Variables (continued) 
 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables 
Variable Name  Definition 
 
          
 
Return of the endowment during the year. 
 
            
 
Max (         , 0). 
 
         
   
 
Min (         , 0). 
 




, Costs y   Universit Total






t i  
 
        
   
 
Max ( t i, Shock , 0). 
 
        
   
 
Min ( t i, Shock , 0). 
 
          
   
 
One-year-lagged value of         
   
 
          
   
 
One-year-lagged value of         
   
             
                        
                        
                           
 
            
    Max (Rev Shock, 0). 
            
    Min (Rev Shock, 0). 
              
    One-year-lagged value of             
   
              
    One-year-lagged value of             




Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the value 
of the university endowment at the start of the year is 
90-110% of the value of the endowment when the 
current university president took office and zero 
otherwise. 
 